ReliaQuest says the extortion group is returning to law firms and using a Microsoft 365 Copilot access token to steal files without deploying malware.
Luna Moth is reportedly returning to law firms it previously tried to extort, this time with a social-engineering operation designed to turn an employee’s own access into a route to sensitive files. The group, also known as Silent Ransom Group, stole a second batch of data from apparent nonpayers in October and early November, according to cybersecurity firm ReliaQuest, which reported the campaign on Nov. 12.
ReliaQuest says firms targeted in May and August were among those approached again. Rather than rely on ransomware or a conspicuous malware infection, the latest tactic centers on impersonation: an attacker poses as IT support during a video call and persuades an employee to copy a Microsoft Graph access token from Microsoft 365 Copilot into a public text-sharing site.
The attackers then replay the token from their own infrastructure and can download thousands of files in about an hour, ReliaQuest said. The sequence may require only a blank-subject email containing a deliberately broken PDF, a spoofed call to an employee’s personal phone, a video meeting and the token handoff. The firm says the method does not require malware, remote-management software or a failed login.
That low-friction approach underscores a hard lesson for organizations: security controls can be undermined not only by software flaws, but by convincing an employee to perform an action that appears to be routine troubleshooting. In this case, the employee becomes the bridge between a legitimate work session and an attacker’s collection of corporate data.
Microsoft is the platform involved, not a reported perpetrator. ReliaQuest’s account describes criminals exploiting a stolen access token associated with Microsoft 365 Copilot; it does not say Microsoft’s systems were breached. Nor does the available reporting establish that Luna Moth is a state-sponsored actor. The campaign is presented as extortion-driven criminal activity, not a nation-state operation.
That distinction matters even as the incident belongs in a broader discussion of cyberspace as contested ground. Law firms hold confidential client material and can be attractive targets for criminals seeking leverage. A second theft from firms that apparently did not pay would increase pressure on victims and their clients, though ReliaQuest’s account does not identify the affected firms or describe the contents of the stolen files.
The episode also shows why a clean device and a successful login are not, by themselves, proof that an access request is safe. The reported chain does not depend on planting conventional malware or triggering an obvious authentication failure. Instead, the attacker seeks an already-issued credential through a staged conversation, then uses it to act from outside the victim’s organization.
ReliaQuest’s findings point to a practical challenge for defenders: suspicious activity may be scattered across email, phone calls, video meetings and cloud-file access. Reviewing those events in isolation can make each step look ordinary. The firm recommends correlating such records with Microsoft 365 activity and watching for unusual access patterns. It also recommends tighter controls over developer tools and unapproved screen-sharing software.
The wider stakes are not a new claim that every corporate breach is an act of geopolitical warfare. They are a reminder that digital access has become a strategic asset—and that adversaries, whether criminal or state-backed, may seek it through people as readily as through code. For organizations handling sensitive information, resisting that pressure requires clear procedures for verifying support requests and treating access tokens as credentials that must never be shared.

